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The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986
DANIEL E. LUNGREN*
On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). This legisla-
tion was completed by Congress one day before the 99th Congress
adjourned. This Article will discuss previous legislative attempts
to control immigration and the evolution of this comprehensive
immigration reform bill. Major provisions that Congressman Lun-
gren believes are integral to comprehensive immigration reform
legislation will be highlighted.
PREVIOUS UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO CRAFT
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Legislation to control illegal or undocumented immigration dates
back to the early 1950's.1 Attempts to pass legislation prohibiting
employment and establishing penalties for the harboring of undocu-
mented aliens back in 1951 and 1952 were only partially successful. 2
The Act of March 20, 1952, subsequently recodified as sections 274
and 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
made the willful importation, transportation, or harboring of un-
documented aliens a felony, punishable by a $2000 fine or imprison-
ment of up to five years, or both.3 However, employment was specifi-
* United States Representative from Long Beach, California. B.A. (cum laude)
1968, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1971, Georgetown University. Congressman Lun-
gren serves as the ranking minority member on the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refu-
gees and International Law. This Article was prepared with the staff assistance of Mar-
garet Webber, Associate Counsel on the House Committee on the Judiciary.
I. D. REIMERS, RECENT IMMIGRATION POLICY: AN ANALYSIS 27-29 (1980); H.R.
REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1986) [hereinafter House Committee Report].
2. D. REIMERS, supra note 1, at 27-29; see also House Committee Report, supra
note 1, at 51.
3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) [herein-
cally exempted from the penalties for harboring in what was
popularly referred to as the "Texas proviso.' 4
The House Judiciary Subcommittee, with special jurisdiction over
immigration matters, held extensive investigative and legislative
hearings on the problem of undocumented aliens during the 92d
Congress beginning in 1971. 5 Subsequently, with the continuous sup-
port of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, the House twice passed
legislation to penalize the knowing employment of illegal aliens.
H.R. 16,188 passed the House during the 92d Congress on Septem-
ber 12, 1972, by voice vote after a motion to recommit it to the
Judiciary Committee was defeated. 6 During the 93d Congress, H.R.
982 passed the House on May 3, 1973.7 Neither bill, however, re-
ceived action by the full Senate.
On January 6, 1975, President Ford established the cabinet-level
Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, chaired by Attorney
General Edward Levi.8 In its December 1976 report, the Domestic
Counsel Committee concluded that the major impact of undocu-
mented aliens seemed to be in the labor market; the report recom-
mended enactment of legislation establishing penalties for knowing
employment of undocumented aliens as well as enactment of a provi-
sion allowing for the regularization of status of certain undocu-
mented aliens. The Committee recommended, among other reforms:(1) that penalties be imposed upon employers who knowingly hire
aliens not authorized to work; (2) that the H-2 and other temporary
worker programs be reevaluated and streamlined to operate more ef-
fectively; and (3) that a humane and practical solution be developed
concerning the status of the large number of undocumented aliens
already here." Similar proposals were included in legislation and
other initiatives forwarded by the Carter Administration in 1977.10
after INA]; see House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 52.
4. INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a); see also Mainland, Counseling Employers
Under the New Immigration Act, 7 CAL. LAW., Feb. 1987, at 44; House Committee
Report, supra note 1, at 52.
5. Hearings were held in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Denver, El Paso, Chi-
cago, Detroit, and New York. See Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. I of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, pts. I-V, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-1972).
6. 118 CONG. REC. 30, 186 (1972) (voice vote passage of H.R. 16,188, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)).
7. 119 CONG. REC. 14,208-09 (1973) (passage of H.R. 982 by vote of 297-263,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)).
8. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ILLE-
GAL ALIENS, Dec. 1976, at 102-12, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
SELECTED READINGS ON US. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW: A COMPENDIUM (Comm.
Print 1980) (reprinted at the request of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY REPORT]; see also House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 53.
9. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 240-44; House Committee Report,
supra note 1, at 53.
10. See H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); 54 INTERPRETER RELEASES 287-
91 (1977); see also House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 53.
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Another enactment of the 95th Congress of relevance to the un-
documented alien issue, was the creation of a sixteen-member Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to conduct a study
of immigration and refugee laws, policies, and procedures, and to
report its findings to the President with recommendations for legisla-
tive and administrative change. 1
The Select Commission's basic conclusion was that support for le-
gal immigration is threatened by uncontrolled illegal immigration.
That conclusion underlies many of the report's recommendations
which included enactment of legislation making it illegal to hire un-
documented aliens, increasing border and interior enforcement, and
legalizing the status of certain aliens illegally present in the United
States.' 2
Joint hearings were held on the report and recommendations of
the Select Commission on May 5, 6, and 7, 1981, under the chair-
manship of Senator Alan K. Simpson (R.-Wyo.) and Congressman
Romano Mazzoli (D.-Ky.). These were the first joint congressional
hearings on immigration since those held in 1951 on the legislation
that was subsequently enacted as the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.1'
Since the Select Commission's recommendations and the joint
hearings, comprehensive immigration reform legislation has been
considered by the 97th,' 4 the 98th,' 5 and the 99th'" sessions of Con-
II. Act of October 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907 (1978) (estab-
lishing a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy); see also House Com-
mittee Report, supra note 1, at 53.
12. See SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 59-60 (1981) [hereinafter
SELECT COMM'N FINAL REPORT]; Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. of Immi-
gration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 4
(1981) (Opening statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) [hereinafter Joint Hearings]; see
also House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 53.
13. Joint Hearings, supra note 12, at 2.
14. See S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); see 128 CONG. REC. S2306 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (noting introduction of S.
2222 by Sen. Simpson); Id. at H951 (noting introduction of H.R. 5872 by Rep. Maz-
zoli); see also House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 54.
15. On February 17, 1983, Congressman Romano L. Mazzoli (D.-Ky) introduced
H.R. 1510, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983. This was essentially the
same bill passed by the House Judiciary Committee in the 97th Congress. See House
Committee Report, supra note 1, at 55.
16. On July 25, 1985, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Peter W.
Rodino, Jr. (D.-NJ) and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees
and International Law, Congressman Mazzoli, jointly introduced H.R. 3080, the Immi-
gress in both the House and Senate.
A commitment to address the immigration issue became a priority
in the newly inaugurated Reagan Administration. President Reagan
established a cabinet-level task force to review the Select Commis-
sion's report and refine its recommendations. Then, under the leader-
ship of Attorney General William French Smith, the Administration
took the initiative by introducing an omnibus reform proposal.17 It
included among its major provisions employee sanctions, a tempo-
rary foreign worker program for up to 50,000 Mexican nationals, a
legalization program, a seven-part program to deal with mass migra-
tions, and an increase in the legal immigration ceilings for Canada
and Mexico. As early as July 30, 1981, the President outlined the
essential contours of a workable immigration policy:
We must ensure adequate legal authority to establish control over immigra-
tion; to enable us, when sudden influxes of foreigners occur, to decide to
whom we grant the status of refugee or asylee; to improve our border con-
trol; to expedite, consistent with fair procedures and our Constitution, re-
turn of those coming here illegally; to strengthen enforcement of our fair
labor standards and law; and to penalize those who would knowingly en-
courage violations of our laws. The steps we take to further these objectives,
however, must also be consistent with our values of individual privacy and
freedom.' 8
Thus, both the Select Commission report as well as the Reagan
Administration proposal, while differing somewhat in their specific
content, sought to address the challenges posed by immigration in a
comprehensive fashion. The die had been cast in a fashion that was
to have a lasting effect on the ultimate shape and contours of the
subsequent congressional response.
IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 97TH CONGRESS
In the 97th Congress, Senator Simpson and Congressman Mazzoli
introduced the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1981 on
May 19, 1982.19 While at first glance, a Senator from Wyoming and
a Congressman from Kentucky might not seem to be the most likely
gration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1985. Senator Alan K. Simpson
(D.-Wyo), in the other body, introduced S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REC.
S7038 (daily ed. May 23, 1985); see also House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 55-
56.
17. S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 4832, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(198 1). See generally Eig & Vialet, Immigration Reform: History and Current Statutes,
1 GEo. IrMi. L., Fall 1985, at 30.
18. Administration's Proposal on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hear-
ing before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, and the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981) (restatement of President Reagan by Hon. William French
Smith, Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter Administration's Proposal].
19. See sources cited supra note 14; see also House Committee Report, supra
note 1, at 54.
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sources of an omnibus immigration reform package, as the Chair-
men of the Immigration Subcommittees of their respective cham-
bers, they addressed the challenge.
The original bills contained provisions which formed the legislative
framework for reform - employer sanctions, a streamlining of the
adjudicatory system, changes in the H-2 temporary agricultural
worker status, and a two-track legalization program under which
those who entered the United States illegally before a 1977 cut-off
date would qualify for permanent resident status and those who en-
tered prior to January 1, 1980, would be classified as temporary resi-
dents for three years. In addition, the two bills included a cap on
legal immigration with respect to the unlimited "immediate relative
category" and the "fifth preference" involving brothers and sisters of
United States citizens.20
The Senate went right to work on its bill and passed the legisla-
tion on August 17, 1982, by a vote of 80 to 19.21 In the House, the
Subcommittee on Immigration marked up its bill on May 19, 1982.22
However, having been "burned" before, the Chairman of the full
Committee on the Judiciary, Peter Rodino, decided to delay consid-
eration until the bill had passed the Senate. In Committee the bill
remained largely intact except for the provisions affecting legal im-
migration which were deleted at Chairman Rodino's insistence. On
September 22, 1982, the House Judiciary Committee reported a
bill.23
Unfortunately, delayed consideration of the bill brought the fate
of the legislation into conflict with the legislative clock. Despite a
post-election "lame duck" session, the bill was allowed to come to
the House floor facing over 100 amendments. That was the death
knell for immigration reform in the 97th Congress.
20. Compare S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) with H.R. 5872, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982); see 128 CONG. REC. 52306 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (noting introduc-
tion of S. 2222 by Sen. Simpson); 128 CONG. REC. H951 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982),(noting introduction of H.R. 5872 by Rep. Mazzoli); see also IMMIGRATION REFORM
AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (PUB. LAW. No. 99-603): A SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986).
21. 128 CONG. REC. SI0,609 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982); see also IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (P.L. 99-603): A SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986).
22. H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. D635 (daily ed. May 19,
1982).
23. H.R. 6514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. D1236 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
1982); H.R. REP. No. 890, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 98TH CONGRESS
Neither Congressman Mazzoli nor Senator Simpson were deterred
by this setback. Immediately, they picked up where they had left off.
The Immigration Subcommittee once again held extensive hearings
on the issue, making great efforts to ensure that the detractors of the
legislation in the prior Congress had an opportunity to fully air
themselves.
Senator Simpson introduced S. 52924 and the bill once again
passed the full Senate by a vote of 76 to 18.25 In the House, the road
proved rocky once again. As in the previous year, action was delayed
by the full Committee until the Senate had completed its task.
While the basic framework of the bill was retained, an agricultural
transition program (to smooth the transition from a largely undocu-
mented labor force to the H-2 program over a three-year period) was
added to the bill at Subcommittee.2" At the House Judiciary Com-
mittee level, a significant change was made to the legalization pro-
gram: the cut-off date was moved from January 1, 1981, as adopted
in Subcommittee, to January 1, 1982.27
Following consideration by the House Judiciary Committee, the
legislation was sequentially referred to the Education and Labor
Committee (concerned with agricultural labor issues and the ques-
tion of discrimination), the Agriculture Committee (concerned with
agricultural labor issues), and the Energy and Commerce Committee
(concerned with social service and health care questions related to
legalization) .28
In October of 1983, House Speaker Tip O'Neill announced that
he would not allow the immigration reform bill to be considered on
the House floor; this compounded the obstacles facing immigration
reform. While divisions within the Democratic Party and presiden-
tial politics were the underlying motivation for this decision, the edi-
torial response across the nation was so overwhelming that it was
soon apparent that the Speaker had misjudged the situation and
would have to reverse his decision.
After a delay of six months, the immigration reform bill tempora-
rily escaped this latest threat to its survival and the next stop was at
24. See 129 CONG. REc. S. 1343 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Simpson) ("I am reintroducing the same bill today that the Senate passed last Au-
gust."). For further reading on legislative activity in the 98th Congress, see Smith, Im-
migration Law Reform: Proposals in the 98th Congress, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv, 7
(1983).
25. See 129 CONG. REc. S6969-70 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
26. Eig & Vialet, supra note 17, at 31-33.
27. H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1 (1983) (accompanying H.R.
1510).
28. For a general discussion of this legislative process, see Eig & Vialet, supra
note 17, at 31-32.
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the House Rules Committee. In retrospect, the Committee deserves
much praise for crafting a rule that allowed a fair consideration of
the major controversial issues while avoiding the legislative anarchy
which had doomed the bill in the previous Congress - between June
11 and June 20, 1984, the House considered and debated some sixty-
nine different amendments.29
Unfortunately, the lengthy delay between floor action and the
House-Senate conference coupled with the makeup of the House
conferees (which included a large number of opponents of the legis-
lation) gave those who sought to kill the bill the swing votes that led
to a deadlock. The conference unraveled. The issue on which every-
thing came apart involved a question that received little attention
during the House debate. An amendment offered by Congressman
Barney Frank on the House floor would have established an enforce-
ment structure analogous to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) for cases involving hiring discrimination. The most conten-
tious element of the provision would have made it illegal for a pri-
vate employer to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens in their
hiring practices. Last-minute efforts were made to construct a com-
promise including a $1 billion cap on reimbursement to the states for
welfare reimbursement in order to increase support among some
Republicans for the Frank amendment. It came to naught, as the
clock once again ran out on immigration reform.30
IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 99TH CONGRESS
On May 23, 1985, Senator Simpson introduced S. 1200. Hearings
were held in mid-June and it was reported by the full Senate Judici-
ary Committee on August 28, 1985.31 It passed the Senate by a vote
of 69 to 30 on September 19, 1985.32 H.R. 3080 was introduced by
Congressmen Rodino and Mazzoli on July 25, 1985.11 Hearings were
held in September and October 1985, and the bill was marked up in
the House Subcommittee on Immigration in November 1985.31 It
29. See House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 55; see also Eig & Vialet,
supra note 17, at 31-34.
30. Eig & Vialet, supra note 17, at 34.
31. See S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
32. S. 1200, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S11750 (daily ed. Sept. 19,
1985).
33. H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H6353 (daily ed. July 25,
1985).
34. Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
was not until June 25, 1986, seven months later, that markup of the
bill occurred in the full House Judiciary Committee. Once again, we
were in the final days of this session of Congress attempting to work
out the details of an important reform bill. The full Committee
markup of the bill occurred on June 25, 1986, and it was reported
from the Committee by a vote of 25 to 10.35 On October 9, 1986, the
House passed the bill"6 and the House-Senate conference was ac-
cepted by the House on October 14, 1986,37 and by the Senate on
October 17, 1986.3' The President signed the bill on November 6,
1986.39
It might be queried as to how - for the third time - we found
ourselves facing adjournment with immigration reform legislation
hanging in the balance. The answer lies in the fact that the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee and other members on the
Democratic side of the aisle sought to reach an accord on the ques-
tion of the admission of foreign agricultural labor, while at the same
time, precluding me from introducing a guest worker amendment
similar to both the so-called Panetta-Morrison amendment adopted
in the previous Congress and the Wilson amendment adopted in the
current Senate bill, S. 1200.40 The obvious concern was that my
amendment, if brought to the floor, probably would pass. The effect
was a series of negotiations among only the Democratic members
which delayed action in the Committee as well as action on the
House floor.
When the bill finally was brought to the House Rules Committee
on September 23, 1986, I sought a rule that would allow a vote on
my amendment as a substitute for the provisions contained in the
House Judiciary Committee bill.41 As written, the Judiciary Com-
mittee bill would have granted temporary resident status to farm
workers who had worked sixty days in American agriculture between
May 1985 and May 1986. These workers would not have been re-
quired to remain in agriculture once they obtained permanent resi-
dent status and would have been eligible for most welfare benefits.
The rule reported by the Rules Committee42 precluded any debate
on this controversial area of the bill. Furthermore, it included a pro-
35. See House Committee Report, supra note 1, at 46.
36. See 132 CONG. REc. H9698-H9708 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
37. See id. at H9940 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
38. See id. at S16879 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986).
39. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987) [hereinafter IRCA].
40. See infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
41. 132 CONG. REc. H8523-27 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement by Rep.
Daniel E. Lungren); see Rules Comm. Hearing on the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
42. See H.R. Res. 559, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. REP. No. 875, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1986).
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vision which would have barred the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) from deporting Salvadorans and Nicaraguans in a
fashion envisioned by the even more controversial Moakley-DeCon-
cini Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) bill.43
This was simply unacceptable to the vast majority of those of us
on the Republican side of the aisle. Accordingly, on September 26,
1986, we sought through a procedural motion a vote on the previous
question which would have allowed the rule to be amended. On this
point, we were defeated by a vote of 196 to 189.4 Voting the rule
down was the only available alternative; we did this by a vote of 202
to 180. 41
At the time, it was believed by many that such action would be
the death knell to immigration reform in the 99th Congress. In fact,
the Washington Post carried an interesting editorial on September
30, 1986, which queried, "And A Failure On Immigration?" It an-
swered its own rhetorical question by explaining, "The bill presented
to the House for a rule last week, though, was not a balanced com-
promise, and the rule that was proposed for the debate would have
locked in a series of controversial amendments . . .-.
The Post editorial then responded to the "finger-pointing" con-
cerning responsibility for the death of the legislation:
Some in the House leadership are now claiming that the Republicans killed
the immigration bill by refusing to accept a controversial package without
change. That's not fair, for many who voted against the rule would have
supported a bill after debate and a series of votes.4 7
While our decision to defeat the rule was obviously a politically
risky proposition, as well as a danger to the bill substantively, the
House would have defeated the legislation in its existing form any-
way. In other words, it was better to use the rule's defeat as a means
of confronting the problems in the bill while there was still time to
make changes that would enhance its chances for passage.
Despite suggestions to the contrary, at no time did those of us who
made the decision to defeat the rule ever feel that this would end any
chance for immigration reform in the 99th Congress. On October 1,
1986, we attempted a tactic aimed at using a little-known provision
of the House rules. Under rule XI, clause 4(c), any member of the
43. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
44. See 132 CONG. REc. H8523-26 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986). (Statement of Rep.
Trent Lott (R.-Miss.)).
45. Id. at H8525.
46. Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
47. Id.
Rules Committee can call up any resolution that has been reported
by the Rules Committee and which is pending action.48 This seem-
ingly obscure rule contained an enormous strength - it provided an
absolute opportunity for the minority party to reintroduce the issue
of immigration reform to the House floor for an open debate.4 9
Although this effort to "bootstrap" a new immigration rule onto
the rule for the Department of Justice Authorization bill went down
to defeat by a vote of 235 to 177,50 it had a telling effect on the
course of events to follow. We made it absolutely clear that the
Republicans were not only serious about immigration reform but
also committed to forcing the House Democratic leadership to allow
us to participate in the legislative process. For the first time I was
invited to participate in a new series of negotiations concerning the
agricultural labor issue and other controversial provisions which had
led to the defeat of the rule. Congressmen Mazzoli, Fish, Rodino,
Schumer, Berman, Panetta, Bryant, Frank, Morrison, and I met in
Chairman Rodino's office on October 2, 3, 6, and finally reached
agreement on October 7. In order to ensure that all this effort would
not be in vain, we essentially "pre-cleared" the agricultural labor
provisions with Senator Simpson and other members of the Senate.
On the night of October 7, the House Rules Committee produced
a rule5l which was consistent with the understanding which had been
reached on the agricultural labor issue and allowed a vote on the
question of EVD for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans.
The bill which reached the House floor included a provision incor-
porated by the Rules Committee which would have provided a sunset
of employer sanctions after a period of six and one-half years.5 2 This
was in contrast to the Kennedy amendment contained in the Senate
bill which would have required a showing of discrimination before
the sanctions would have been subject to a sunset.
48. See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI, cl. 4(c).
49. Congressman Trent Lott, a member of the Rules Committee and the Minor-
ity Whip, explained his action to exercise rule XI, clause 4(c):
Our intention here by calling up this rule is to have the full hour for debate, in
which we will explain exactly what we are trying to do on the immigration
reform rule, and after that 1 hour of debate we would urge our colleagues to
defeat the previous question, defeat the previous question, at which point a rule
would be offered allowing for immigration reform to be considered, a fair rule,
that would make in order the bill that was reported by the Committee on the
Judiciary, the rule that was reported by the Committee on Rules, but with
some very crucial changes in that rule, that would be a bipartisan change in
the rule, so that we can get this issue up.
132 CONG. REc. H8796 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Trent Lott (R.-
Miss.)).
50. Id. at H8804.
51. See House Rule H.R. Res. 580, 132 CONG. REc. D1284 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1986).
52. Id.
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As in the prior Congress, the discrimination issue had led to a
significant debate over the so-called Frank amendment. The most
controversial aspect of the amendment created a new cause of action
for alienage discrimination, that is, discrimination on the basis of
noncitizenship. It was my feeling that unless this issue was addressed
on the House floor, it could potentially lead to another stalemate.
Many members believed that there may be a host of reasons why an
employer might prefer to hire a citizen over a noncitizen which are
not connected to discrimination. Accordingly, the House adopted my
amendment to provide that if two equally qualified individuals, one a
citizen, the other a noncitizen, apply for the same job, a mere prefer-
ence for the citizen would not ipsofacto lead to a finding of discrim-
ination. 53 While the administrative apparatus set up to enforce the
Frank amendment was still troublesome to some, it was my feeling
that my "citizenship on equal terms amendment" would mitigate the
major opposition to the provision and increase the likelihood that we
would adopt legislation.
Another significant area of debate on the House floor concerned
the McCollum amendment to eliminate the legalization provisions
contained in the bill. Congressman Bill McCollum of Florida, a sup-
porter of immigration reform, had introduced an identical amend-
ment in the prior Congress which was defeated by a vote of 233 to
195. The debate this time around was once again emotionally
charged. To the surprise of many, the legalization provisions of the
bill were sustained by a margin of only seven votes - 199 to 192. 5
This vote clearly indicated that a considerable amount of support for
legalization had been lost within a two-year period. To some extent
this can be attributed to "compassion fatigue" and concern over the
potential magnitude of the program. In addition, the inclusion of the
modified Schumer agricultural program may have mitigated, to
some extent, support for the general legalization program.
Another area of the bill which generated much debate involved
the issue of EVD for Salvadorans or Nicaraguans. With language
taken from the Moakley-DeConcini bill,55 this section would have
barred the deportation of individuals from both of these groups until
after the completion of an eighteen-month study conducted by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) concerning conditions in Central
53. See 132 CONG. REC. H9767-69 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
54. See id. at D1291 (Roll Call No. 455).
55. H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also HR. REP. No. 755, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 (1986).
America. The practical effect of the section would have been to
grant de facto permanent resident status to all within these groups,
irrespective of their reasons for coming to or remaining in the United
States. The significance of this legislation in the context of the immi-
gration bill, however, is that it was even more controversial than the
question of immigration reform itself. Yet on an extremely close vote
of 199 to 197, an amendment offered by Congressman Hamilton
Fish to strike the provision from the bill failed. 8
The remaining hurdle of final passage was overcome with seeming
ease. This was significant because in the last Congress, the legisla-
tion was adopted by only a five-vote margin (216 to 21 1).57 This
time the final margin of victory was considerably larger with a vote
of 230 to 166 in favor of the bill.8 This change of sentiment can be
explained by a number of factors. First, the learning curve on this
issue had generated a consensus that reform was necessary for our
country. Secondly, while the bill was not an ideal response from any-
one's perspective, the fact that it was now viewed as a true compro-
mise increased support from some who had not earlier supported im-
migration reform.
While the agricultural labor provisions were clearly a stumbling
block in getting a bill to conference, it was somewhat of a luxury to
have already reconciled the major differences with respect to the
shape and contours of the program.
With little time for delay, the bill went to Conference by October
10, 1986,11 where the last efforts to work out the differences between
the House and Senate versions of the bill were made.
One issue of major concern at the Conference was the different
treatment of the respective sunset provisions in the House and Sen-
ate bills. Under the House version, the sanctions would have sunset
automatically after six and one-half years from the date of enact-
ment. Under the Senate provisions, discrimination attributable to
sanctions would have to be reported by the GAO and acted on by
the Congress before the sunset provisions would be terminated.60
Employer sanctions are obviously the heart of the enforcement
thrust of the legislation. Hence, an automatic sunset provision was
not acceptable to most of the Republican members as well as to the
Senate Conferees. The approach adopted by the Senate had been
crafted by Senator Kennedy and was directly tied to the question of
56. See H.R. 822, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); 132 CONG. REc. D1291-2 (daily
ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (Roll Call No. 456).
57. See 130 CONG. REC. H6149 (daily ed. June 20, 1984) (Roll Call No. 251).
58. 132 CONG. REC. D1291 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (Roll Call No. 457).
59. See id. at D1300 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986).
60. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §
121 (1986).
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discrimination.61 The problem in the House bill was that it could
give rise to a sunset regardless of whether discrimination was found
to exist. Under such a formulation, it would have been possible to
have a significant legislation program without any assurance that the
major enforcement provision of the bill would endure. The symmetry
created by the dual tracks of legislation and enforcement would be
destroyed. Aside from the public policy questions raised by the
amendment, it was most unlikely that such an approach could have
passed the Senate. In the end, the Senate provisions were adopted.6 2
Another issue related to employer sanctions concerned employer
verification of the eligibility of new employees to work in the United
States. The House bill provided that every employer be required to
verify any two out of a number of documents 3 and attest in writing
that he or she had seen the documentation. Following this process
would raise a presumption of compliance in hiring on the employer's
behalf should he or she ever be charged with a violation of the sanc-
tions provision. Rather than mandate such a paperwork burden, the
Senate version left it voluntary; however, in the absence of
paperwork, it created a presumption against the employer to the ef-
fect that he or she would be considered to have knowingly hired any
employees who turned out to be illegal. In the end, the Senate ver-
sion was seen to be unworkable and was rejected by the Conference.
The language of the Senate bill directing the President to monitor
and evaluate the verification system was accepted. If the President
finds that the system is not secure, provision is made for the adoption
of a more secure system of employment authorization." It should
also be noted that the bill includes enhanced criminal penalties for
the misuse of these immigration-related documents.
As in the previous House-Senate conference, the question of reim-
bursement to the states for social service costs incurred by those to
be legalized received a great deal of attention. The provisions in the
House bill provided "such sums as are necessary," while the Senate
bill contained a capped entitlement for grants to states for $300 mil-
lion each year for the two years following the end of the legalization
application period and $600 million each year for four years. The
focus of the debate, however, centered around comments made by
61. Id.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
63. Compare H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) with S. 1200, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1986); S. REP. No.
132, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 121 (1986).
64. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3363 (amending/adding INA § 274(d)(1)(A)).
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the President to a number of us during an Oval Office meeting in the
White House in early 1986. At that time, the President had indi-
cated that he could accept a reimbursement program which included
a cap of $1 billion per year, for a period of four years.
Although data provided by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) indicated that this would be more than sufficient to cover
anticipated expenses,65 representatives from state and local govern-
ments wanted a guaranteed 100% reimbursement. While it was
probable that such an approach would have resulted in a veto, there
were some who had difficulty comprehending that, in the absence of
passage of the bill, state and local jurisdictions would receive noth-
ing. Throughout the entire legislative process, many of them had to
be reminded of a simple mathematical calculation; that is, 100% of
nothing equals nothing. The universe of those to be legalized was
limited to those already in this country. And, since those illegal
aliens were already using public services to some degree, it was hard
to imagine how the plight of local jurisdictions would not be greatly
alleviated with the one billion dollar annual commitment. Moreover,
a blank federal check for programs largely structured on the state
and local level is not a formula for fiscal responsibility through vigor-
ous oversight. The cap was ultimately adopted in the Conference.
Another difference between the House and Senate bills was the
legalization date. Under the House bill, temporary status would have
been provided to those aliens who entered this country or fell into
illegal status prior to January 1, 1982, and who have continuously
resided in the United States since then. The alien beneficiary would
then be eligible to adjust to permanent resident status after one year,
upon a demonstration of basic citizenship skills. Under the Senate
bill, temporary status would have been provided those aliens in the
United States in an undocumented status prior to January 1, 1980,
only after a commission established under the bill issued its findings
that effective enforcement was instituted, or three years from the
date of enactment, if later.
The Conference did not have as much difficulty with this issue as
was expected. The passage of time itself had brought the 1982 date,
which then amounted to a five-year period of continuous residency,
to the point where a majority of Conferees recognized that sufficient
equities would exist in this class of people to justify such an ex-
traordinary remedy. Consequently, the House position was
adopted.68
The final issue which generated much controversy was reconcilia-
65. See the information provided by CBO in H.R. RE.P. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 127-35 (1986).
66. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245A(a)(2).
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tion of the differences surrounding EVD. As a vigorous opponent of
the concept, Senator Simpson was expected to resist the effort to
deal with this issue in the context of the immigration bill. Certainly
the Reagan Administration was expected to veto any bill containing
the Moakley-DeConcini approach. While the policy arguments sur-
rounding EVD are beyond the scope of this Article, many questioned
loading additional "baggage" onto a bill which already approached
excessive magnanimity. However, the tragic Salvadoran earthquake
generated sufficient sympathy to provide a gesture of concern for
those in the United States who might be affected. The Conference
Committee decided to include language in the statement of manag-
ers suggesting that the Attorney General consider the effects of this
tragedy with respect to Salvadoran deportation cases. The EVD lan-
guage was otherwise dropped from the bill.
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL
ACT
The law that emerged from the 99th Congress contains common
elements of the legislation from the past several congresses. These
elements have been integral to the immigration reform debate and
have been included in immigration legislation since the Select Com-
mission issued its 1981 report. The historical genesis of these provi-
sions dates back to the first legislative efforts in the 1950's.
Employer Sanctions
The centerpiece of this comprehensive immigration reform bill is
sanctions against employers who knowingly hire, refer, or recruit un-
documented aliens for jobs. Previous law imposed no sanctions on
employers who hire illegal aliens.67
As a nation we could no longer ignore the collective wisdom of
four administrations and the Select Commission which told us that
any comprehensive reform effort must embody employer sanctions as
the key element of enforcement. If we are going to "demagnetize"
the attraction of employment in the United States, we must have
sanctions for employers who knowingly hire those who enter without
benefit of papers. Without effective employer sanctions, the United
States will be unable to regain control of its borders. 8
67. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
68. See SELECT COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 61; see also Immigra-
tion Reform & Control Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 1510 Before the House Sub-
Nevertheless, the concept remained controversial. During congres-
sional hearings on immigration reform, Congress heard several argu-
ments against the implementation of employer sanctions. 69
Some argued that it would be preferable to deal with the immigra-
tion problem through United States foreign assistance to countries
from which people emigrate.7 0 Admittedly, poor conditions in less-
developed countries usually give rise to the incentive to leave. How-
ever, as long as the relative wage rates are higher in the United
States than in the sending countries, there will be strong incentives
for undocumented aliens to make the trek here.
To be sure, some foreign assistance measures, such as the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative, are necessary. But economic development is a
long-term process. Given the problems posed by collectivist economic
policies of many less-developed countries, it is simply not possible to
eliminate the disparities overnight. In any event, Congress does not
have the luxury of avoiding the present onslaught of illegal immigra-
tion in hopes that problems within the sending countries will be ad-
dressed sometime in the distant future.
Critics have charged that the mixed experience in other countries
and in eleven states demonstrates that employer sanctions will not
work. It is true that one GAO report did indicate that sanctions were
not uniformly successful in the nineteen countries that were studied.
But more to the point, the study referred to the significant reasons
behind the findings - primarily insufficient penalties and a general
lack of enforcement.7 1 In Germany, for example, the burden for im-
plementing the law has fallen almost exclusively on local police.
Also, because lenient judges have imposed minimal fines, sanctions
have had little deterrent effect. The situation was much the same in
France.
In fact, the report to Congress stated nothing more controversial
than when laws are not enforced, they do not work. A subsequent
GAO report suggested that there has been a change in attitude
about the need for enforcement; preliminary indications are positive.
For instance, both Germany and France have strengthened their em-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 242-73(1983) (Testimony of Alan Nelson, Commissioner of the INS) [hereinafter House Hear-
ings, 98th Cong.].
69. See Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings Before
the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
70. See House Hearings, 98th Cong., supra note 68, at 902-26 (Testimony of
John Heurta, Associate Counsel of Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund).
71. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: INFORMATION ON SE-
LECTED COUNTRIES' EMPLOYMENT PROHIBITION LAws, No. GAO-GGD-86-17BR 1-3(1985).
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ployer sanctions. 2 In fact, the report indicates that most countries
reported that employer sanctions have helped to deter illegal alien
employment. 3
Another criticism of employer sanctions is that they will en-
courage discrimination against "foreign-looking" individuals. Such a
charge is ironic since those of us who supported employer sanctions
did so with the express intent to prevent, rather than promote dis-
crimination. The illegal status of undocumented workers has been
one of the primary causes of exploitation and discrimination in the
workplace. Moreover, this sub rosa labor pool displaces American
minority workers from available job opportunities.7 4
Nonetheless, the sponsors of the legislation recognized the con-
cerns about unintended discrimination which could arise from a
poorly drafted or implemented law. Therefore, in crafting employer-
sanctions provisions, Congress tried to build in safeguards to ensure
uniform application. The verification requirements of the bill require
the employer to verify the employment status of everyone hired re-
gardless of appearance or speech pattern.75 The Conference agree-
ment embodied provisions of the House bill which will establish an
enforcement vehicle analogous to the NLRB with a special counsel
to investigate and prosecute allegations of discrimination.
Some have alleged that employer sanctions would impose an un-
fair burden on employers. This is simply not true. The legislation
merely requires the inspection of any two out of a number of possible
documents, such as a passport, Social Security card, alien documen-
tation or driver's license, to ensure the employee's identity and eligi-
bility to work in the United States. 6 This would, in most cases, par-
allel the normal hiring process. Both employer and employee would
then sign a single form as evidence of compliance with the law.
7 7
Our country has a compelling national interest in regulating immi-
gration - one that warrants cooperation from the private sector.
72. Id. at 8-9, 10-11.
73. Id.
74. See "The Knowing Employment of Illegal Immigrants": Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
75. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3360 (amending/adding INA § 274A(a)(1)(B).
76. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3361-62 (amending/adding INA § 274A(b)(1)(B),
(C) and (D).
77. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3361-62 (amending/adding INA § 274A(b)(1),
(2)).
Legalization
Another provision of this legislation central to the historical dis-
cussion of immigration reform legislation involves legalizing those
who reside within our communities without benefit of papers.78 The
question of legalization arose only because Congress had failed in
the past to muster the courage to reform our immigration laws. The
primary reason that we currently have a large undocumented popu-
lation in our midst is that we have had neither a sufficient body of
law nor sufficient resources underlying our enforcement policy. We
simply were not able to apprehend these people when they entered
our country illegally.
The question of legalization also bears on the enforcement thrust
of immigration reform legislation. The attempt to regain control over
our borders must of necessity involve the most effective utilization of
scarce resources. This end is best served by an emphasis on eliminat-
ing the future flow of illegal immigration along the border. In addi-
tion, legalization has been considered an essential element of immi-
gration reform to deal with the humanitarian concern of those
individuals - although illegal - who have established roots in the
United States.
A failure to provide a substantial legalization program would ig-
nore the equities of those people who have lived in the United States
for a number of years, perpetuate the existence of a large underclass
of illegal aliens, and continue to subject citizens and lawful perma-
nent resident aliens, as well as undocumented aliens, to enormous
social costs.
The 1981 Select Commission's unanimous vote in favor of legali-
zation underscored the absence of a viable alternative to conferring
legal status on many undocumented aliens. 9 The United States sim-
ply lacks the machinery to deport millions of people. An attempt at
mass deportation, moreover, would subject members of minority
groups to probable discriminatory treatment and involve the United
States in foreign policy difficulties with major sending countries. For
these reasons, a legalization program was not only preferable, it was
essential.
The bill adopted by the Congress grants one-year temporary status
for undocumented aliens who have been physically present and who
have continuously resided in the United States, except for brief cas-
ual innocent absences, since the date of enactment and also have
resided in the United States since before January 1, 1982.80 Persons
78. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245A).
79. See SELECT COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 72-75.
80. IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394-95 (amending/adding INA § 245A(a)
(1986)).
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receiving temporary status will be able to adjust to permanent resi-
dent status after eighteen months from the date that temporary resi-
dence is granted."' In order to qualify the alien must satisfy mini-
mum English requirements and a minimum understanding of
American government and history. The Attorney General can waive
these required citizenship skills in cases involving aliens sixty-five
years or older.8 2
The Foreign Worker Program for Agriculture
Since the 97th Congress, immigration legislation has included a
streamlined H-2 agricultural worker program. Additionally, the
House, during the 98th Congress, and the Senate, during the 99th
Congress, adopted agricultural provisions to address the concerns of
those who grow perishable commodities.8 3 Although a small portion
of the total number of undocumented aliens work in agriculture, the
agricultural industry itself is heavily dependent on an illegal
workforce. The undocumented population in agriculture is estimated
to be only fifteen percent of the total undocumented population.
4
As former INS Commissioner Leonel Castillo eloquently charac-
terized the situation sometime ago, "the U.S. is experiencing the
world's largest temporary worker program, larger than the
guestworker programs of France, Holland and Germany. Only ours
is unregulated . . . resulting in the Immigration Service having to
arrest over a million persons annually . . . whose crime is that they
want to work in this country." 85 The critical concern for Congress
was to control the number of foreign workers coming into this coun-
try and still meet the needs of agriculture - especially for those who
find the current H-2 program not adequate to serve their agricul-
tural needs.
Congress has sought through this legislation to regularize the flow
of undocumented aliens into a legal framework that will afford legal
protection of foreign workers as well as protection of domestic work-
ers from displacement and satisfaction of the legitimate needs of
American agricultural producers.
The United States produces more than $130 billion of agricultural
81. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3395-97 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)).
82. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3396 (amending/adding INA § 245A(b)(D)(ii)).
83. See H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); S. 1200, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.(1985).
84. Administration's Proposal, supra note 18, at 7 (Testimony of Attorney Gen-
eral William French Smith).
85. 132 CONG. REc. H2578 (daily ed. May 9, 1986).
products annually.86 Nearly $14 billion of that amount is accounted
for by fruit, vegetables, and other labor-intensive commodities. More
than 800,000 farmers employ hired workers and more than two mil-
lion United States residents earn some or all of their income from
farm work.8 7 Many millions more are employed in supply inputs to
agricultural production or handling agricultural products. All of
these people, indeed the entire nation, have a stake in an adequate
agricultural workforce.88
The jobs of seasonal American farmworkers and of many farmers
are dependent on an adequate supply of total seasonal agricultural
labor (traditionally made up of foreign as well as domestic workers).
Hundreds of millions of dollars of domestic payroll and farm income
will be lost to foreign producers if adequate seasonal labor is not
available to United States farmers. 89
Agricultural employers in many areas of the United States cannot
obtain adequate seasonal labor to meet their needs. Many United
States workers appear to be unwilling or unable to accept short-term
seasonal agricultural employment. Many of these jobs are in rural
areas that would require United States workers to remain away from
home as migratory workers for extended periods of time. The United
States migratory agricultural workforce has declined dramatically in
recent years, while the demand for labor in seasonally labor-intensive
harvesting of fruit, vegetables and other commodities has increased.
Since insufficient domestic labor is available for agriculture needs,
many areas of the country depend on foreign workers to supplement
domestic labor.90
H-2 Agricultural Workers
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 authorized the tem-
porary admission and employment of aliens in jobs for which there
are not sufficient qualified and available United States workers, if
the employment of the alien will not adversely affect United States
workers similarly employed. "1 In recent years, from 60,000 to 75,000
of these "H-2" workers have been admitted to the United States an-
nually, about one-third of them for agricultural jobs.92
Admission of H-2 workers is governed by regulations of the INS.9 3
86. Id. at H2578.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See House Hearings, 98th Cong., supra note 68, at 457-65 (Statement of
Perry Ellsworth, National Council of Agricultural Employers).
90. 132 CONG. REc. H2578 (daily ed. May 9, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Daniel
E. Lungren).
91. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii).
92. 132 CONG. REc. H2578 (daily ed. May 9, 1986).
93. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(H)(ii).
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The labor certification process is governed by regulations of the
United States Department of Labor.94 Nonagricultural labor certifi-
cations, which make up about two-thirds of the total are subject only
to local recruitment and local prevailing wages and benefits.9 5 Agri-
cultural H-2 labor certifications are governed by a much more strin-
gent set of requirements."
The H-2 program has sometimes made it possible to produce agri-
cultural commodities requiring labor-intensive seasonal operations in
areas where sufficient domestic labor was not available for these op-
erations.9 7 This has expanded the economic base in these areas, cre-
ating more year-round and long-term seasonal agricultural jobs for
United States farmers, farmworkers and workers in agri-business in-
dustries. On the heavy soils of south Florida, the raw sugar produced
there provides thousands of year-round and seasonal jobs for United
States workers and a $115 million payroll in 1984.98 The H-2 cane
harvesters in south Florida earned a payroll of $35 million in 1984,
and averaged more than seven dollars per hour.99
The legislation passed by Congress codifies modifications intended
to streamline the H-2 program and make it more attractive to the
agricultural community. 100 The fact remains, however, that the
20,000 or so H-2 agricultural workers in the program in recent years
make up only a small part of our foreign agricultural labor force.
The majority of this foreign labor force has been undocumented for-
eign migrant workers who have come here during certain times of
the year to earn higher wages. It is difficult to estimate exactly how
many of these foreign workers and their families actually have come
to the United States at any one time. However, we do know that the
number is several hundred thousand. 10 1
94. 132 CONG. REC. H2578 (daily ed. May 9, 1986).
95. Id. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 655.
96. Lungren & Holsclaw, An Analysis of the H-2 Program: The Admission of
Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers into the United States, YALE L. & PoL'Y
REV., Spring 1983, at 241.
97. Id.
98. 132 CONG. REC. H2578-79 (daily ed. May 9, 1986) (Statement of Rep.
Daniel E. Lungren).
99. Id. at H2579.
100. IRCA § 301(a), 100 Stat. at 3411 (amending/adding INA § 216).
101. Temporary Workers: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1981)
(statement of A. James Barnes, General Council of the Department of Agriculture).
History of the Agricultural Foreign Worker Provision for
Perishable Crops
Although the H-2 program works well for some growers, it has not
worked for others, specifically in the perishable crop industry. In
California, the H-2 program has not been used to any degree. Those
in agriculture in the western states find it more convenient to rely on
an undocumented population that is, for all intents and purposes, be-
yond the protection of our labor laws.102 Those in western agricul-
ture have argued that the perishable nature of their crops, as com-
pared to sugar, made the regulatory maze of the H-2 program (prior
to the changes contained in IRCA) unresponsive to their needs. 103
The needs of agriculture, as proven during the many years of con-
gressional hearings and inquiry, impelled Congress to consider this
issue on two separate tracks: an H-2 provision and a perishable crop
provision. I included a perishable crop provision in the bill I intro-
duced in the 99th Congress - H.R. 1061.104 In the Senate the Wil-
son amendment was added to S. 1200 to accommodate the perisha-
ble crop industry.10 5 S. 1200 and the provision introduced in H.R.
1061 are similar to a provision adopted in the House bill, H.R. 529
in the 98th Congress, called the Panetta-Morrison amendment. 0
The Wilson amendment, or perishable crop provision included in
the Senate bill, S. 1200, created a program for the admission of tem-
porary workers coming to the United States to perform seasonal ag-
ricultural services in perishable commodities, as defined by the Sec-
retary of Agriculture by regulation. The provision allowed up to
350,000 such workers to be in the United States at any one time.
The program would have sunset after three years.10 7
No labor certification was required ahead of time. Instead, a
grower would be required to make a "good faith" effort to recruit
domestic workers and would have to accept qualified domestic refer-
rals and offer wages and working conditions that would not adversely
affect domestic workers.
The Wilson proposal divided the nation into ten agricultural re-
gions. Foreign workers with agricultural experience would be given
preference over other foreign workers, and a trust fund, consisting of
102. See House Hearings, 98th Cong., supra note 68, at 535-36 (Testimony of
Henry J. Voss, President of California Farm Bureau Federation).
103. Id.
104. H.R. 1061, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Introduced by Rep. Daniel E. Lun-
gren); see also 131 CONG. REc. H401 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (noting introduction of
bill).
105. For the Senate debate on the Wilson amendment, see 131 CONG. Rac.S1 1,319-27, 11330-44 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1985); 131 CONG. REC. S1 1,603-10 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1985) (Amendment No. 616 was adopted Sept. 17, 1985).
106. See 130 CONG REC. H5863-70 (daily ed. June 14, 1984).
107. See supra note 105.
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twenty percent of the worker's salary would be deposited in the
worker's home country, payable only upon the worker's timely return
home. Employers would pay eleven percent of each worker's wages
into a trust fund to cover administrative costs.
Foreign workers would be allowed to stay in one of the agricul-
tural regions of the United States for up to thirty days while unem-
ployed and seeking a job. Growers would be required to notify the
Attorney General within seventy-two hours after a worker left their
employ.
Under the plan, growers were required to conduct specific domes-
tic worker recruitment efforts until foreign workers report to work.
In addition, they were specifically required to provide summaries to
the Attorney General of the prior year's recruitment efforts in order
to participate in the program.
Growers were specifically required to provide such wages and
working conditions as established by the Attorney General and their
failure to do so would result in their disqualification from the pro-
gram. It is critical to note that growers would have been required to
provide the wages and conditions to workers comparable to those re-
quired under the H-2 program, including payment of the adverse af-
fect wage rate, the provision of housing, and the provision of work-
ers' compensation or its equivalent.
Workers who were admitted into the program would be permitted
a maximum length of stay of nine months. This did not mean that
all workers would be admitted for nine months. The Attorney Gen-
eral would have the discretion to admit workers for any length of
time up to nine months. In most instances workers would be admit-
ted for a shorter time coinciding with peak harvest periods. An
outside limit of nine months was chosen because in some regions the
growing season for crops lasts nine months and longer. Those partici-
pating in the Seasonal Worker Program could not hire H-2 workers.
In a somewhat surprising development, the Wilson amendment was
adopted on the Senate floor amid one of the most controversial de-
bates of S. 1200.108
In the 99th Congress, the issue of agricultural labor again domi-
nated markup of the House bill by the House Judiciary Committee.
The bill as ordered reported by that Committee included what was
then known as the Schumer-Berman-Panetta amendment. 10 9
108. See supra note 105.
109. H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986) (reported from the House Judiciary
Committee, July 16, 1986); see H.R. REP. No. 682 pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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Designed in large part as an alternative to a temporary worker pro-gram, the amendment was criticized by opponents during markup as
creating a rolling legalization program because it gave foreign work-
ers permanent residency immediately - with all the benefits of citi-
zenship except the right to vote.
Radical legislative surgery on this approach was necessary in or-der to save the bill itself. As earlier explained, the version stitched
together in the second week in October became the final product.
The seasonal agricultural worker program signed into law in the99th Congress grants temporary legal resident status to any alien
who has performed at least ninety man-days in seasonal agricultural
services from May 1, 1985 to May 1, 1986.110 This group would re-
main in this temporary status for a period of two years, at which
time they could apply to adjust their status to that of a permanent
resident.""
A second group of workers would be allowed to adjust to perma-
nent residency after one year if it could be demonstrated that they
worked ninety man-days in each of the last three years. This group
would contain a numerical cap of 350,000 participants. 12
Both before and during the application period, the bill provides for
a temporary stay of exclusion or deportation for an apprehended
alien who establishes a nonfrivolous case of eligibility until he is
proven to be ineligible.113
Replenishment Workers
In the event a determination of agricultural labor shortage is es-
tablished, the bill provides for replenishment of foreign workers for
four years (1990-1993), contingent upon the certification by the Sec-
retaries of Agriculture and Labor that a shortage of agricultural
workers exists. The number to be admitted is determined by a spe-
cific formula of anticipated need minus supply of agricultural work-
ers for that year.11 4
The bill requires the Attorney General to admit for temporary res-ident status the number of aliens equal to the shortage number and
requires their adjustment to permanent resident status after a three-
year period.115 The replenishment workers are required to work
ninety man-days of seasonal agricultural services in each year for
110. IRCA § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
111. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3417-18 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(2)(B)).112. Id. § 302(a), 100 Stat. at 3418 (amending/adding INA § 210(a)(2)(A), (c)).113. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3399 (amending/adding INA § 245A(e)(1)).114. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3422 (amending/adding INA § 210A(a)).115. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3427-28 (amending/adding INA § 210A(c)(1),(d)(5)(A)).
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three years to avoid deportation and to become eligible for perma-
nent resident status.'16
The Director of the Bureau of the Census is required to report
annually to Congress on the estimated number of special agricultural
workers. This section also disqualifies replenishment workers from
receiving public benefits for a five-year period to the same extent as
newly legalized aliens with the exception of eligibility under the
Food Stamp Act and Housing Act. 1
The bill requires employers to provide equal transportation ar-
rangements and services to domestic workers as those provided to
alien agricultural workers. It also makes applicable certain rights,
remedies, and penalties under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricul-
tural Worker Protection Act. 18
Aliens admitted under this section may not be naturalized as
United States citizens unless they have performed ninety man-days
of seasonal agricultural services in each of five fiscal years.119
Section 304 establishes a Commission on Agricultural Workers
composed of twelve members appointed by the President and Con-
gress to review the impact of the special agricultural provisions on
domestic farmworkers. 20
IMMIGRATION REFORM LEGISLATION: THE FUTURE
Continued immigration is vital to the health, wealth, and vitality
of our nation. The contributions of immigrants in our history and in
our midst are incalculable. Yet, to suggest that we should allow all
who seek to come here carte blanche entry is to abdicate our sover-
eignty as a nation. To suggest that we can acommodate all the peo-
ples of the world who desire to live here is unrealistic. Instead, we
must define a policy that is compassionate, realistic and fair. To par-
aphrase the Select Commission, "we should seek to close the back
door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigra-
tion may remain open.''
The passage of immigration reform legislation in the 99th Con-
gress is by no means the final chapter on United States immigration
policy. The full impact of this legislation will not be known for many
116. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(5)(A)).
117. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3427-28 (amending/adding INA § 210A(b)(3),
(d)(6)).
118. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3430 (amending/adding INA § 210A(f)).
119. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3428 (amending/adding INA § 210A(d)(5)(B)).
120. Id. § 304(a).
121. See SELECT COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 2-3.
years to come. Congress, however, cannot simply sit back and wait to
see what happens. In addition to the many commissions already set
up by the legislation, Congress will need to diligently exercise its
oversight responsibilities with respect to this legislation and undoubt-
edly make technical changes and modifications to its many provi-
sions. The next logical legislative step would be to address the many
issues involving legal immigration. Particular consideration shouldbe given to the value of "seed immigration," that is, those who bring
special skills or economic benefits to the United States independent
of the familial relationships for the most part required by the present
preference system.
Yet, whatever future changes may be needed, it is clear that con-
gressional and Administration support for passage of this immigra-
tion reform legislation in the 99th Congress reflects a heightened
sense of urgency to address the current problems of illegal immigra-
tion in this country - problems which continue to grow each day.
This challenge can be demonstrated statistically by the increase in
INS apprehensions of undocumented aliens. By the end of fiscal year1986, 1.7 million undocumented aliens were apprehended in theUnited States - almost double that of the 1980 figure of 900,000
and an increase of one-third over the previous year. 22 While many
aliens are apprehended more than once, it is simply not possible to
attribute this numerical increase to greater INS efficiency. Economic
and civil strife south of our border juxtaposed with economic oppor-
tunity in the United States has generated enormous pressures to emi-
grate. According to a recent report by the GAO:
California is now absorbing more than one quarter of the legal immigrantsto the United States. Since 1975, California has been host to approximately
one third of the newly arriving refugees to this country. For'the state as a
whole, almost 60 percent of the recent immigrants have come withoutproper documentation. Recent immigrants have tended to settle in southernCalifornia, and in Los Angeles in particular. Almost half of all post-1970immigrants, documented and undocumented, live in Los Angeles County;68 percent live in southern California."
The living conditions at the border continue to worsen as growing
numbers live in poverty without access to minimal human require-
ments, such as adequate food and housing, because of their illegal
status. Some argue that this situation parallels this country's earlyhistory with slavery. While history will be the ultimate judge, I be-lieve there was simply no alternative to the immigration reform leg-
122. Apprehensions rose from 910,361 in the fiscal year 1980, to a record1,770,000 in the fiscal year 1986. Schmidt, Detention of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv.305, 306 n.8 (1987), in this issue.
123. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, BUDGET ISSUES: IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.
- FEDERAL BUDGET IMPACT 1984-1995, No. GAO-AFMD-86-53BR, Appendix II, 61(1986).
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islation. At a time when we had virtually lost control of our borders,
a growing sub rosa population was arising within our midst. As a
sovereign and compassionate nation, this situation was entirely un-
tenable. From the standpoint of both American workers as well as
those sentenced to "third world" living conditions within our borders,
something needed to be done.
No one will attribute divine inspiration to the immigration reform
bill. Yet, the alternative of doing nothing would have evidenced the
lack of any inspiration at all on the part of our nation's leadership.
The immigration reform bill was certainly a compromise. None of
its supporters consider this the perfect solution. While many of its
individual provisions would not have garnered majority support
alone, the bill as a package brought together a coalition of individu-
als with diverse ideological and political backgrounds. And that un-
usual, often tenuous coalition added up to a majority in the Con-
gress. While this posed an unacceptable threat to the orthodoxy of
some members, it should not detract from the significance of this
accomplishment. All things considered, in the give and take of the
legislative process, Congress finally produced an immigration bill
that is in the national interest.

